Standard and Poor's is warning that the EU's stricter emissions rules will put its carmakers at serious competitive disadvantage, and could adversely affect their credit quality. This is just one of many such challenges that the EU will face as it tries to control emissions; it remains to be seen how much economic pressure the commission is prepared to withstand.
Wednesday, March 21, 2007
Britain Proposes Allowing Schools to Forbid Full-Face Muslim Veils
British authorities proposed new rules on Tuesday to allow schools to forbid Muslim students to wear full-face veils in class, reflecting a wider debate over Britain’s relationship with its Muslim minority.
The recommendation was the latest episode in a saga of rancorous discussion of the full-face veil, known as the niqab. Last October, Prime Minister Tony Blair described the niqab as a “mark of separation” that made “other people from outside the community feel uncomfortable.”
The Department of Education published the new guidelines after a court in Buckinghamshire rejected a 12-year-old Muslim girl’s demand to wear the niqab in class last month.
The proposed regulations, which have yet to be formally adopted, said the individual right to “manifest a religion or belief” did not bestow a right to demonstrate faith “at any time, in any place or in any particular manner.”
School principals should be allowed to order pupils to show their faces because otherwise “the teacher may not be able to judge their engagement in class,” the proposed regulations said. Moreover, they said, “schools need to be able to identify individual pupils in order to maintain good order and identify intruders easily.”
The issue of Islamic dress in schools has been contentious in many parts of Europe, sometimes pitting secularist ideologies against the religious beliefs of growing Islamic minorities.
But Islamic dress made headlines in Britain for another reason recently, when a trial of terrorism suspects included surveillance television footage of a male suspect at a bus station as he fled London in what appeared to be an all-covering burqa-style dress.
Jim Knight, the schools minister, said Tuesday that schools should consult with parents when setting their regulations on permissible uniforms. “While they should make every effort to accommodate social, religious or medical requirements of individual pupils, the needs of safety, security and effective learning in the school must always take precedence,” he said in a statement.
The government’s position drew angry responses from some Muslim groups, including the Islamic Human Rights Commission, whose chairman, Massoud Shadjareh, said it was “simply shocking” for the government to “issue guidance against Muslim communities.”
“Successive ministers dealing with education issues have failed to give proper guidance when requested by human rights campaigners about schools’ obligations regarding religious dress, including the head scarf,” he said.
Others sought to defuse the debate by insisting that disagreements over dress codes could be resolved within schools. “The vast majority of schools are able to solve these issues locally, and that should continue to be the case,” said Tahir Alam, a spokesman for the Muslim Council of Britain.
The proposed dress regulations also included recommendations enjoining school principals not to discriminate indirectly against minorities by banning hair styles “more likely to be adopted by specific racial groups.”
The rules urged school authorities to outlaw forms of dress “associated with gangs,” but said students should not be expelled for refusing to wear standard school uniforms except in the event of “persistent and defiant” transgressions.
The recommendation was the latest episode in a saga of rancorous discussion of the full-face veil, known as the niqab. Last October, Prime Minister Tony Blair described the niqab as a “mark of separation” that made “other people from outside the community feel uncomfortable.”
The Department of Education published the new guidelines after a court in Buckinghamshire rejected a 12-year-old Muslim girl’s demand to wear the niqab in class last month.
The proposed regulations, which have yet to be formally adopted, said the individual right to “manifest a religion or belief” did not bestow a right to demonstrate faith “at any time, in any place or in any particular manner.”
School principals should be allowed to order pupils to show their faces because otherwise “the teacher may not be able to judge their engagement in class,” the proposed regulations said. Moreover, they said, “schools need to be able to identify individual pupils in order to maintain good order and identify intruders easily.”
The issue of Islamic dress in schools has been contentious in many parts of Europe, sometimes pitting secularist ideologies against the religious beliefs of growing Islamic minorities.
But Islamic dress made headlines in Britain for another reason recently, when a trial of terrorism suspects included surveillance television footage of a male suspect at a bus station as he fled London in what appeared to be an all-covering burqa-style dress.
Jim Knight, the schools minister, said Tuesday that schools should consult with parents when setting their regulations on permissible uniforms. “While they should make every effort to accommodate social, religious or medical requirements of individual pupils, the needs of safety, security and effective learning in the school must always take precedence,” he said in a statement.
The government’s position drew angry responses from some Muslim groups, including the Islamic Human Rights Commission, whose chairman, Massoud Shadjareh, said it was “simply shocking” for the government to “issue guidance against Muslim communities.”
“Successive ministers dealing with education issues have failed to give proper guidance when requested by human rights campaigners about schools’ obligations regarding religious dress, including the head scarf,” he said.
Others sought to defuse the debate by insisting that disagreements over dress codes could be resolved within schools. “The vast majority of schools are able to solve these issues locally, and that should continue to be the case,” said Tahir Alam, a spokesman for the Muslim Council of Britain.
The proposed dress regulations also included recommendations enjoining school principals not to discriminate indirectly against minorities by banning hair styles “more likely to be adopted by specific racial groups.”
The rules urged school authorities to outlaw forms of dress “associated with gangs,” but said students should not be expelled for refusing to wear standard school uniforms except in the event of “persistent and defiant” transgressions.
LOGICAL ENDINGS
Computers may soon be better than kin at predicting the wishes of the dying
When machines trespass into the area of medical ethics, though, hackles rise. Here it is not the doctor that is being second-guessed, but the patient's relatives. The question is, if you were in a coma, whom would you more trust to come to the conclusion that you would want: your spouse or a machine?
David Wendler, of the National Institutes of Health in Bethesda, Maryland, and his colleagues have looked into this question. Their answer, just published in the Public Library of Science Medicine, is surprising. At the moment, both are equally reliable—but only the machines are likely to get better at it.
Dr Wendler's study began last year, when his team reviewed all the experiments they could find that had attempted to test how well people predict the wishes of patients with life-threatening conditions. Some of these studies used real patients whose conditions might have led them to fall into a coma—when, obviously, they could not make the decision for themselves. Others employed surrogates who were asked to make “living wills” outlining their preferences for treatment (or the lack of it) in various hypothetical circumstances. The desires expressed by these patients, whether real or surrogate, were then compared with what those patients' kin predicted the patients would want, and also with the predictions of unrelated people (doctors, for example) who might be called on to make the decision if kin could not be found.
Dr Wendler found 16 published reports containing almost 20,000 pairs of decisions. His analysis showed that kin and patient agreed only 68% of the time. When they did not agree, kin were more likely to recommend treatment when the patient wanted treatment withdrawn rather than mistakenly to recommend withdrawal. Surprisingly, the bias towards treatment was equally strong when the decision was made by an unrelated person such as a doctor.
Other research has suggested that the variable most reliably governing whether a patient would want the machine turned off is the “1% rule”. This is that people seem to want life-saving interventions if there is at least a 1% chance they will recover the ability to reason, remember and communicate. Less than 1%, and it is time to pull the plug.
Calculating will
Using that rule of thumb, Dr Wendler and his colleagues wrote a computer program that assesses the prognosis for a patient, based on the sort of clinical criteria that the studies had described to both patients and predictors. Only 12 of the 16 original studies contained sufficient detail to be used, but the result was remarkable. In these 12 studies, human predictors guessed the patient's wishes rather more accurately than was true when all 16 were lumped together—getting them right 78.4% of the time. Dr Wendler's program achieved an almost identical result—78.5%.
At the moment, such data do not exist. No one has yet had a reason to collect them. But they do have a reason now. The decision about when to pull the plug on a patient who is not expected to recover is unlikely ever to be handed over completely to a machine. But when no kin can be found, the program's opinion might help. And even when a dying patient is surrounded by people who care about him, those people may welcome some guidance about what his wishes were likely to have been. Individuals are, indeed, individual. But that does not mean their dying wishes are all that different.
When machines trespass into the area of medical ethics, though, hackles rise. Here it is not the doctor that is being second-guessed, but the patient's relatives. The question is, if you were in a coma, whom would you more trust to come to the conclusion that you would want: your spouse or a machine?
David Wendler, of the National Institutes of Health in Bethesda, Maryland, and his colleagues have looked into this question. Their answer, just published in the Public Library of Science Medicine, is surprising. At the moment, both are equally reliable—but only the machines are likely to get better at it.
Dr Wendler's study began last year, when his team reviewed all the experiments they could find that had attempted to test how well people predict the wishes of patients with life-threatening conditions. Some of these studies used real patients whose conditions might have led them to fall into a coma—when, obviously, they could not make the decision for themselves. Others employed surrogates who were asked to make “living wills” outlining their preferences for treatment (or the lack of it) in various hypothetical circumstances. The desires expressed by these patients, whether real or surrogate, were then compared with what those patients' kin predicted the patients would want, and also with the predictions of unrelated people (doctors, for example) who might be called on to make the decision if kin could not be found.
Dr Wendler found 16 published reports containing almost 20,000 pairs of decisions. His analysis showed that kin and patient agreed only 68% of the time. When they did not agree, kin were more likely to recommend treatment when the patient wanted treatment withdrawn rather than mistakenly to recommend withdrawal. Surprisingly, the bias towards treatment was equally strong when the decision was made by an unrelated person such as a doctor.
Other research has suggested that the variable most reliably governing whether a patient would want the machine turned off is the “1% rule”. This is that people seem to want life-saving interventions if there is at least a 1% chance they will recover the ability to reason, remember and communicate. Less than 1%, and it is time to pull the plug.
Calculating will
Using that rule of thumb, Dr Wendler and his colleagues wrote a computer program that assesses the prognosis for a patient, based on the sort of clinical criteria that the studies had described to both patients and predictors. Only 12 of the 16 original studies contained sufficient detail to be used, but the result was remarkable. In these 12 studies, human predictors guessed the patient's wishes rather more accurately than was true when all 16 were lumped together—getting them right 78.4% of the time. Dr Wendler's program achieved an almost identical result—78.5%.
At the moment, such data do not exist. No one has yet had a reason to collect them. But they do have a reason now. The decision about when to pull the plug on a patient who is not expected to recover is unlikely ever to be handed over completely to a machine. But when no kin can be found, the program's opinion might help. And even when a dying patient is surrounded by people who care about him, those people may welcome some guidance about what his wishes were likely to have been. Individuals are, indeed, individual. But that does not mean their dying wishes are all that different.
THE GLOBAL GLASS CEILING
The highest percentage of women in senior management can be found in the Philippines, according to a report by Grant Thornton International, a consultancy. This reflects a tradition of wide participation in society there. Similarly, the egalitarian legacy of communism could explain the high proportion of women near the top of companies in China and Russia.
Sub-prime lending
Subprime lending (also: B-Paper, B-tier, non-prime, near-prime, special finance, second chance lending) describes a specific lending market sector. Typically, subprime customers are those who do not qualify for prime market rates because of a blemished or limited credit history. Subprime customers are therefore charged a higher interest rate, to compensate for the increased future probability of default.
The general lending philosophy can be described as "priced to risk," where the interest rate the borrower pays increases as their risk level to the lender increases. In the United States, subprime borrowers are generally defined as individuals with limited income or a FICO credit score below 620 (on a scale between 300 and 850).
Origins and Motivations
Subprime lending evolved the same way as other businesses, with a realization of the demand in the marketplace and then providing a supply to meet it. With divorce being common in society, bankruptcies and consumer proposals being widely accessible, a constantly fluctuating economic environment, and consumer debt load on the rise, traditional lenders are more cautious and have been turning away a record amount of potential customers.[citation needed] Statistically, approximately 25% of the population falls into this category (credit score < 620).[citation needed]
Motivation for the Lender
To access this increasing market, lenders take on the risks associated with lending to people with poor credit ratings. Subprime loans are considered to be risky for the lender due to borrower's weaker or limited credit history. A weak credit history may include a history of late credit card payments, one or more 30 day mortgage lates, and notices of default. Lenders subsquently adjust their underwriting criteria to reflect the increased payment risk. This payment risk is reflected by charging a higher interest rate over the life of the loan.
Motivation for the Borrower
Subprime lending offers the opportunity for borrowers with less then ideal credit to gain access to credit. Borrowers subsequently use this credit to purchase homes, or in the case of a cash out refinance, finance other forms of spending such as purchasing a car, paying for living expenses, or even paying down a high interest credit card. However due to the risk profile of the subprime borrower, this access to credit comes at the price of higher interest rates.
Subprime Lending and Re-establishing Personal Credit
Some subprime finance companies offer customers with poor credit a chance to re-establish their credit and eventually become a prime customer. Consumers with poor credit can borrow at higher-interest rates from subprime lenders. Once the borrower has shown responsibility in paying off debts and re-established a positive payment history, credit rating can increase. While an overwhelming majority of mortgage loans, subprime or otherwise, are reported to credit bureaus, not all are.[citation needed] Customers wishing to re-establishing their credit should check that their payment history is reported.
Recent Problems with Sub-Prime Lenders
Recently many subprime lenders have gone bankrupt or stop making loans. The prevailing cause for their insolvency or exit from the subprime market is increased defaults from the loans these lenders have originated. The increase in defaults can be artibuted to the type of loans being made by subprime lenders. A common subprime loan product is the "2-28" loan. A "2-28" loan is a loan with a low initial interest rate that is fixed for two years. After two years the interest rate resets to a higher adjustable rate for the remaining life of the loan, in this case 28 years. Other varients of the "2-28" loan product are the "3-27" and the "4-26". One of the concerns with such loan products is that the borrower qualifies for the initial start rate which may be as low 1-2% APR. After say 2 years, when interest rate resets, the borrower may suddenly find themselves unable to make their payments. The new interest is typically some margin over an adjustable index. For example 5% over 12 month LIBOR which would be 10.203% as of 3-19-07. Many of the loans made to subprime borrowers in the recent real estate boom have been of the "2-28" variety. The "2-28" product is designed to have the borrower refinance after 2 years, when the fixed portion of the loan is over. For the borrower refinancing is not problematic provided that their homes have held or increased in value. If the borrower has some equity in their home then depreciating home values are not so troubling. However what happens when the borrower has borrowed 100% of the value of their home and the value of their home decreases? In such a situation the borrower is said to be "underwater": owing more then the home is worth. Borrowers finding themselves unable to refinance out of crushing monthly payments are faced with two options: keep making payments or stop making payments. In the latter case the borrower defaults on their loan resulting in a loss of revenue for the lender.
New Century Financial, previously the second largest sub-prime mortgage lender in the U.S., in March 2007 stopped accepting loan applications was delisted from the NYSE as a result of difficulties with its subprime loans.
The general lending philosophy can be described as "priced to risk," where the interest rate the borrower pays increases as their risk level to the lender increases. In the United States, subprime borrowers are generally defined as individuals with limited income or a FICO credit score below 620 (on a scale between 300 and 850).
Origins and Motivations
Subprime lending evolved the same way as other businesses, with a realization of the demand in the marketplace and then providing a supply to meet it. With divorce being common in society, bankruptcies and consumer proposals being widely accessible, a constantly fluctuating economic environment, and consumer debt load on the rise, traditional lenders are more cautious and have been turning away a record amount of potential customers.[citation needed] Statistically, approximately 25% of the population falls into this category (credit score < 620).[citation needed]
Motivation for the Lender
To access this increasing market, lenders take on the risks associated with lending to people with poor credit ratings. Subprime loans are considered to be risky for the lender due to borrower's weaker or limited credit history. A weak credit history may include a history of late credit card payments, one or more 30 day mortgage lates, and notices of default. Lenders subsquently adjust their underwriting criteria to reflect the increased payment risk. This payment risk is reflected by charging a higher interest rate over the life of the loan.
Motivation for the Borrower
Subprime lending offers the opportunity for borrowers with less then ideal credit to gain access to credit. Borrowers subsequently use this credit to purchase homes, or in the case of a cash out refinance, finance other forms of spending such as purchasing a car, paying for living expenses, or even paying down a high interest credit card. However due to the risk profile of the subprime borrower, this access to credit comes at the price of higher interest rates.
Subprime Lending and Re-establishing Personal Credit
Some subprime finance companies offer customers with poor credit a chance to re-establish their credit and eventually become a prime customer. Consumers with poor credit can borrow at higher-interest rates from subprime lenders. Once the borrower has shown responsibility in paying off debts and re-established a positive payment history, credit rating can increase. While an overwhelming majority of mortgage loans, subprime or otherwise, are reported to credit bureaus, not all are.[citation needed] Customers wishing to re-establishing their credit should check that their payment history is reported.
Recent Problems with Sub-Prime Lenders
Recently many subprime lenders have gone bankrupt or stop making loans. The prevailing cause for their insolvency or exit from the subprime market is increased defaults from the loans these lenders have originated. The increase in defaults can be artibuted to the type of loans being made by subprime lenders. A common subprime loan product is the "2-28" loan. A "2-28" loan is a loan with a low initial interest rate that is fixed for two years. After two years the interest rate resets to a higher adjustable rate for the remaining life of the loan, in this case 28 years. Other varients of the "2-28" loan product are the "3-27" and the "4-26". One of the concerns with such loan products is that the borrower qualifies for the initial start rate which may be as low 1-2% APR. After say 2 years, when interest rate resets, the borrower may suddenly find themselves unable to make their payments. The new interest is typically some margin over an adjustable index. For example 5% over 12 month LIBOR which would be 10.203% as of 3-19-07. Many of the loans made to subprime borrowers in the recent real estate boom have been of the "2-28" variety. The "2-28" product is designed to have the borrower refinance after 2 years, when the fixed portion of the loan is over. For the borrower refinancing is not problematic provided that their homes have held or increased in value. If the borrower has some equity in their home then depreciating home values are not so troubling. However what happens when the borrower has borrowed 100% of the value of their home and the value of their home decreases? In such a situation the borrower is said to be "underwater": owing more then the home is worth. Borrowers finding themselves unable to refinance out of crushing monthly payments are faced with two options: keep making payments or stop making payments. In the latter case the borrower defaults on their loan resulting in a loss of revenue for the lender.
New Century Financial, previously the second largest sub-prime mortgage lender in the U.S., in March 2007 stopped accepting loan applications was delisted from the NYSE as a result of difficulties with its subprime loans.
Tuesday, March 20, 2007
Talking dirty in China
Beijing has been producing daily pollution reports since 1999. Even so, until recently officials went on referring to this soul-sapping grey pall as wu, or “fog”, a word that sounded more benign in weather reports. Residents have tended to follow suit, even though their semi-desert climate is too dry much of the year for fog, produced by water vapour near the ground.
When the city finally steeled itself last month to introduce warnings specifically for “haze”, produced by pollutant particles suspended in the air.
The quality of the city air is attracting more attention thanks mainly to the Olympic Games, which open in Beijing in August 2008. A 500-day countdown starts on March 27th. The games will be held at a time of year when the city climate can be unbearably hot and also very humid, even without the haze.
International scrutiny is certainly helping. Without the Olympics, it is unlikely that Beijing would be trying at all hard to curb atmospheric pollution.
The general result of all this is a popular awareness of environmental health threats so low that even the vocabulary is unfamiliar. Beijing’s citizens now know that they have haze. It may be a long time yet before they see it dispelled.
When the city finally steeled itself last month to introduce warnings specifically for “haze”, produced by pollutant particles suspended in the air.
The quality of the city air is attracting more attention thanks mainly to the Olympic Games, which open in Beijing in August 2008. A 500-day countdown starts on March 27th. The games will be held at a time of year when the city climate can be unbearably hot and also very humid, even without the haze.
International scrutiny is certainly helping. Without the Olympics, it is unlikely that Beijing would be trying at all hard to curb atmospheric pollution.
The general result of all this is a popular awareness of environmental health threats so low that even the vocabulary is unfamiliar. Beijing’s citizens now know that they have haze. It may be a long time yet before they see it dispelled.
Material Shows Weakening of Climate Reports
A House committee released documents Monday that showed hundreds of instances in which a White House official who was previously an oil industry lobbyist edited government climate reports to play up uncertainty of a human role in global warming or play down evidence of such a role.
Across NASA, researchers and career public affairs workers spoke up to alert The New York Times to rising political interference with the flow of science news to the public. A week after The Times’s first story, Michael Griffin, the NASA administrator, issued a statement "on scientific opennness" to the agency's 19,000 employees saying changes would be made.
In a hearing of the House Committee on Oversight and Government Reform, the official, Philip A. Cooney, who left government in 2005, defended the changes he had made in government reports over several years. Mr. Cooney said the editing was part of the normal White House review process and reflected findings in a climate report written for President Bush by the National Academy of Sciences in 2001.
He was hired by Exxon Mobil after resigning in 2005 following reports on the editing in The New York Times. The White House said his resignation was not related to the disclosures.
Mr. Cooney said his past work opposing restrictions on heat-trapping gases for the oil industry had had no bearing on his actions once he joined the White House. “When I came to the White House,” he testified, “my sole loyalties were to the president and his administration.”
Mr. Cooney, who has no scientific background, said he had based his editing and recommendations on what he had seen in good faith as the “most authoritative and current views of the state of scientific knowledge.”
The hearing also produced the first sworn statements from George C. Deutsch III, who moved in 2005 from the Bush re-election campaign to public affairs jobs at NASA. There he warned career press officers to exert more control over James E. Hansen, the top climate expert at the space agency.
Mr. Deutsch resigned last year after it was disclosed that he had never graduated from Texas A&M University, as his résumé on file at NASA said. He has since completed work for the degree, he said Monday.
Democrats focused on fresh details that committee staff members had compiled showing how Mr. Cooney made hundreds of changes to government climate research plans and reports to Congress on climate that raised a sense of uncertainty about the science.
The documents “appear to portray a systematic White House effort to minimize the significance of climate change,” said a memorandum circulated by the Democrats under the committee chairman, Representative Henry A. Waxman of California.
Across NASA, researchers and career public affairs workers spoke up to alert The New York Times to rising political interference with the flow of science news to the public. A week after The Times’s first story, Michael Griffin, the NASA administrator, issued a statement "on scientific opennness" to the agency's 19,000 employees saying changes would be made.
In a hearing of the House Committee on Oversight and Government Reform, the official, Philip A. Cooney, who left government in 2005, defended the changes he had made in government reports over several years. Mr. Cooney said the editing was part of the normal White House review process and reflected findings in a climate report written for President Bush by the National Academy of Sciences in 2001.
He was hired by Exxon Mobil after resigning in 2005 following reports on the editing in The New York Times. The White House said his resignation was not related to the disclosures.
Mr. Cooney said his past work opposing restrictions on heat-trapping gases for the oil industry had had no bearing on his actions once he joined the White House. “When I came to the White House,” he testified, “my sole loyalties were to the president and his administration.”
Mr. Cooney, who has no scientific background, said he had based his editing and recommendations on what he had seen in good faith as the “most authoritative and current views of the state of scientific knowledge.”
The hearing also produced the first sworn statements from George C. Deutsch III, who moved in 2005 from the Bush re-election campaign to public affairs jobs at NASA. There he warned career press officers to exert more control over James E. Hansen, the top climate expert at the space agency.
Mr. Deutsch resigned last year after it was disclosed that he had never graduated from Texas A&M University, as his résumé on file at NASA said. He has since completed work for the degree, he said Monday.
Democrats focused on fresh details that committee staff members had compiled showing how Mr. Cooney made hundreds of changes to government climate research plans and reports to Congress on climate that raised a sense of uncertainty about the science.
The documents “appear to portray a systematic White House effort to minimize the significance of climate change,” said a memorandum circulated by the Democrats under the committee chairman, Representative Henry A. Waxman of California.
Students’ Right to Free Speech
The Supreme Court heard arguments yesterday in a case that has attracted attention mainly because of its eccentric story line: An Alaska student was suspended from high school in 2002 after he unfurled a banner reading “Bong Hits 4 Jesus” while the Olympic torch passed by. But the case raises important issues of freedom of expression and student censorship that go far beyond the words on that banner. The court should affirm the appeals court’s well-reasoned decision that when the school punished the student it violated his First Amendment rights. The principal took it from him, and suspended him for 10 days.
Mr. Frederick says the suspension violated his rights. The school board insists the principal had the right to confiscate the banner and punish the student because the language undermined its teachings about the dangers of illegal drugs. The San Francisco-based United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit ruled for Mr. Frederick, citing the 1969 case Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community School District, which held that students have the right to free speech, which can be suppressed only when the speech disrupts school activities.
The Bush administration joined the school district in arguing that schools have broad authority to limit talk about drugs because of the importance of keeping drugs away from young people. But if schools can limit speech on any subject deemed to be important, students could soon be punished for talking about the war on terror or the war in Iraq because the government also considers those subjects important.
Some school administrators would no doubt use their power to clamp down on conservative speech while others would clamp down on liberal speech. A school that values diversity could punish students who criticize affirmative action, while a more conservative school could ban students from taking outspoken positions about global warming. Religious groups have joined civil libertarians in backing Mr. Frederick because they fear schools will punish students who talk about their religious beliefs.
If the Supreme Court wants to dodge the free-speech-in-school issues, it could rule that the off-campus Olympic torch event was not a formal school activity — and that the principal had no right to limit anyone’s free speech there. That would not harm students’ free speech rights, but it would also do little to affirm them.
The court should go further, and rule that Mr. Frederick’s rights were infringed. Students do not have the right to interfere substantially with school activities, but Mr. Frederick did not do that. The court should use this case to reaffirm Tinker’s famous pronouncement that students do not shed their right to free speech “at the schoolhouse gate.”
Mr. Frederick says the suspension violated his rights. The school board insists the principal had the right to confiscate the banner and punish the student because the language undermined its teachings about the dangers of illegal drugs. The San Francisco-based United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit ruled for Mr. Frederick, citing the 1969 case Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community School District, which held that students have the right to free speech, which can be suppressed only when the speech disrupts school activities.
The Bush administration joined the school district in arguing that schools have broad authority to limit talk about drugs because of the importance of keeping drugs away from young people. But if schools can limit speech on any subject deemed to be important, students could soon be punished for talking about the war on terror or the war in Iraq because the government also considers those subjects important.
Some school administrators would no doubt use their power to clamp down on conservative speech while others would clamp down on liberal speech. A school that values diversity could punish students who criticize affirmative action, while a more conservative school could ban students from taking outspoken positions about global warming. Religious groups have joined civil libertarians in backing Mr. Frederick because they fear schools will punish students who talk about their religious beliefs.
If the Supreme Court wants to dodge the free-speech-in-school issues, it could rule that the off-campus Olympic torch event was not a formal school activity — and that the principal had no right to limit anyone’s free speech there. That would not harm students’ free speech rights, but it would also do little to affirm them.
The court should go further, and rule that Mr. Frederick’s rights were infringed. Students do not have the right to interfere substantially with school activities, but Mr. Frederick did not do that. The court should use this case to reaffirm Tinker’s famous pronouncement that students do not shed their right to free speech “at the schoolhouse gate.”
Monday, March 19, 2007
Acquiring emissions quotas
If a country is not allocated enough emissions quotas to meet its Kyoto targets, it can turn to the so-called flexibility mechanisms to get more. What exactly are these mechanisms? And can a country use them as much as it likes instead of reducing greenhouse gas emissions through domestic action?
By Kristin Rypdal
By the end of 2006, the countries that have ratified the Kyoto Protocol and have emissions targets (the so-called Annex I countries) are required to report their 1990 emissions (or another approved base year) to the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC). When the inventories have been reviewed and approved – and corrected for any deficiencies uncovered during the audit – it will be clear how much each country will be allowed to emit during the first commitment period of the Kyoto Protocol (2008-2012). This will form the basis for allocation of emissions quotas (assigned amounts). Before the flexibility mechanisms can be used, a satisfactory national quota registry and an approved national system for reporting emissions and removals in following years must be established. A country can also be refused permission to trade quotas if the quality of its emissions reporting is unacceptable.
Buying and selling quotas
If the number of quotas allocated to a country isn’t enough, there are a number of ways to get more. Buying emissions quotas from Annex I countries with a right to trade is one possibility. Trading can take place between countries, businesses, or other legal entities. In the EU Emissions Trading System, there will be limits to which sources can be included in this type of trade, and there are requirements for measuring and verifying the emissions from legal entities that participate. Important emissions sources in Europe, such as power plants and industries, will be included in the system. Another way to obtain quotas is to invest in mitigation projects in developing countries though the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) and in other Annex I countries through joint implementation (JI). The projects must be approved in accordance with the regulations and monitored satisfactorily.
In addition to the flexibility mechanisms, the net carbon removal in forests as a result of increased forest area within national borders also gives extra quotas. It is also possible to choose to get credit for uptake, or reduced emissions, resulting from changing the way other areas are managed, areas such as agricultural land, existing forest areas, or areas that are allowed to return to their natural state. This choice must be made in 2006 and will require monitoring and reporting of removals and emissions from these areas also in the following commitment periods.
In addition to selling quotas, a country can lose quotas through cancellation. Canceled quotas disappear from the system and cannot be sold or used to meet commitments. Quotas can be canceled for several reasons, including net emissions from forests. Quotas can also be canceled voluntarily – for example, an environmental organization can purchase quotas and cancel them. After the commitment period, the quotas are retired as settlement for what was emitted during the period. Since the emissions will not be known until two years after the first commitment period is over in 2012, there will be a period when countries can trade quotas to help them to meet commitments or to be rid of extra quotas. If a country is left with extra quotas after that, they can be transferred to a subsequent commitment period. However, there are limits to transferring quotas acquired from mitigation projects or uptake in forests.
Long-term emissions targets
The parties to the Kyoto Protocol have agreed on a comprehensive regulatory framework for the use of the flexibility mechanisms and for allocating and deleting quotas from the management of forests and other land areas. The technical regulations themselves also limit how easy it is to obtain quotas – to ensure that credits are only given for genuine, verifiable, and permanent reductions in emissions or increases in uptake. The question is whether Norway can purchase as many quotas as it needs, as long as it follows the technical regulations. The parties have agreed that domestic action – and not the use of the flexibility mechanisms – should constitute a significant element of the efforts to meet the Kyoto targets, and that the mechanisms should come only as a supplement to domestic action. However, there is no formal ceiling on the use of the mechanisms, and an absolute ceiling would be difficult to quantify since emission levels without domestic action are not easy to define. But all countries must document that their use of the mechanisms takes place in addition to domestic measures. This information will be part of the evaluation of how a party is in compliance with its overall obligations. The last, and perhaps most important, question is whether it is wise to meet the targets by using the flexibility mechanisms extensively instead of implementing more domestic measures.
The usual argument is that it does not make any difference for the climate whether the emissions take place in Norway or in other countries because the ceiling for emissions under the Kyoto Protocol is fixed. From a short-term economic perspective, it is thus only a question of whether it is cheaper to use the mechanisms or to implement domestic measures to meet the targets in 2012. The intention of the Kyoto Protocol is, however, that it should be followed up with a more stringent agreement after 2012. This means it can be sensible to also consider more long-term emissions goals in the decision about whether to buy quotas or to implement domestic measures to meet the targets in 2012. If domestic measures mean more development and investment in new climate-friendly technology than would occur through purchasing quotas from other countries, a longer time-horizon than 2012 can mean that it will pay off to implement domestic measures even though it makes meeting Kyoto targets more expensive.
By Kristin Rypdal
By the end of 2006, the countries that have ratified the Kyoto Protocol and have emissions targets (the so-called Annex I countries) are required to report their 1990 emissions (or another approved base year) to the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC). When the inventories have been reviewed and approved – and corrected for any deficiencies uncovered during the audit – it will be clear how much each country will be allowed to emit during the first commitment period of the Kyoto Protocol (2008-2012). This will form the basis for allocation of emissions quotas (assigned amounts). Before the flexibility mechanisms can be used, a satisfactory national quota registry and an approved national system for reporting emissions and removals in following years must be established. A country can also be refused permission to trade quotas if the quality of its emissions reporting is unacceptable.
Buying and selling quotas
If the number of quotas allocated to a country isn’t enough, there are a number of ways to get more. Buying emissions quotas from Annex I countries with a right to trade is one possibility. Trading can take place between countries, businesses, or other legal entities. In the EU Emissions Trading System, there will be limits to which sources can be included in this type of trade, and there are requirements for measuring and verifying the emissions from legal entities that participate. Important emissions sources in Europe, such as power plants and industries, will be included in the system. Another way to obtain quotas is to invest in mitigation projects in developing countries though the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) and in other Annex I countries through joint implementation (JI). The projects must be approved in accordance with the regulations and monitored satisfactorily.
In addition to the flexibility mechanisms, the net carbon removal in forests as a result of increased forest area within national borders also gives extra quotas. It is also possible to choose to get credit for uptake, or reduced emissions, resulting from changing the way other areas are managed, areas such as agricultural land, existing forest areas, or areas that are allowed to return to their natural state. This choice must be made in 2006 and will require monitoring and reporting of removals and emissions from these areas also in the following commitment periods.
In addition to selling quotas, a country can lose quotas through cancellation. Canceled quotas disappear from the system and cannot be sold or used to meet commitments. Quotas can be canceled for several reasons, including net emissions from forests. Quotas can also be canceled voluntarily – for example, an environmental organization can purchase quotas and cancel them. After the commitment period, the quotas are retired as settlement for what was emitted during the period. Since the emissions will not be known until two years after the first commitment period is over in 2012, there will be a period when countries can trade quotas to help them to meet commitments or to be rid of extra quotas. If a country is left with extra quotas after that, they can be transferred to a subsequent commitment period. However, there are limits to transferring quotas acquired from mitigation projects or uptake in forests.
Long-term emissions targets
The parties to the Kyoto Protocol have agreed on a comprehensive regulatory framework for the use of the flexibility mechanisms and for allocating and deleting quotas from the management of forests and other land areas. The technical regulations themselves also limit how easy it is to obtain quotas – to ensure that credits are only given for genuine, verifiable, and permanent reductions in emissions or increases in uptake. The question is whether Norway can purchase as many quotas as it needs, as long as it follows the technical regulations. The parties have agreed that domestic action – and not the use of the flexibility mechanisms – should constitute a significant element of the efforts to meet the Kyoto targets, and that the mechanisms should come only as a supplement to domestic action. However, there is no formal ceiling on the use of the mechanisms, and an absolute ceiling would be difficult to quantify since emission levels without domestic action are not easy to define. But all countries must document that their use of the mechanisms takes place in addition to domestic measures. This information will be part of the evaluation of how a party is in compliance with its overall obligations. The last, and perhaps most important, question is whether it is wise to meet the targets by using the flexibility mechanisms extensively instead of implementing more domestic measures.
The usual argument is that it does not make any difference for the climate whether the emissions take place in Norway or in other countries because the ceiling for emissions under the Kyoto Protocol is fixed. From a short-term economic perspective, it is thus only a question of whether it is cheaper to use the mechanisms or to implement domestic measures to meet the targets in 2012. The intention of the Kyoto Protocol is, however, that it should be followed up with a more stringent agreement after 2012. This means it can be sensible to also consider more long-term emissions goals in the decision about whether to buy quotas or to implement domestic measures to meet the targets in 2012. If domestic measures mean more development and investment in new climate-friendly technology than would occur through purchasing quotas from other countries, a longer time-horizon than 2012 can mean that it will pay off to implement domestic measures even though it makes meeting Kyoto targets more expensive.
Flaws in the Kyoto Protocol
There was already much scepticism before the Kyoto Summit as to whether the meeting would result in the tough decisions necessary to avert climate chaos. The flawed Protocol that emerged from the Summit has done little to dispel such cynicism.
by Tan Cheng Li
THE much touted Kyoto Protocol on climate change almost did not materialise. Negotiators worked overnight and extended the meeting by a day to eventually put it together.
But they needn't have bothered. For the document agreed upon in Kyoto, Japan, on 11 December is a flawed one: it has none of the drastic emissions curbs scientists say are essential in averting climate chaos.
Yes, the agreement is historically important as it will, for the first time, legally bind developed countries to rein in emissions of heat-trapping gases. But in practical terms the Kyoto Protocol is an empty vessel which is unlikely to turn down the heat.
At Kyoto, major environmental groups decided that the final agreement will be judged on three points: whether it has the most stringent reduction targets possible; whether it is completely free from loopholes which allow emissions to increase; and whether it has automatic and real penalties for cheating.
The protocol fails on all points. It is a compromise, acknowledges Malaysia's climate treaty negotiator Chow Kok Kee, a Meteorological Services director.
KEY FEATURES
Target Cutbacks
Developed countries must
cut their 1990-level emissions
of six gases by 5.2% between
2008 and 2012.
Japan has the most modest goal,
a cut of 6%, compared with 7%
for the US and 8% for the EU.
Coal-exporting Australia, however,
will increase its emissions by 8%.
Emissions trading
Countries that overshot their
emissions-reduction targets
can "buy" emissions rights
from nations which have excess. Joint Implementation
Emission cuts need not be
confined to within the country.
They can be implemented elsewhere,
with the financing country claiming
credit for the resulting emissions
savings.
Carbon Sinks
To tabulate its total emissions,
a country can subtract the
amount of gases absorbed by
carbon sinks such as forests
within its borders.
Emissions banking
A country that emits less than
its assigned target can keep the
excess for the subsequent period.
'We are not happy with the outcome. The protocol does not address core issues such as setting adequate targets. But in such international negotiations, there is always some compromise.'
Environmentalists are less charitable.
'The protocol is unlikely to make any difference. It gives the false impression that a breakthrough has been achieved but there are too many loopholes,' says Gurmit Singh, regional co-ordinator of Climate Action Network South-East Asia, an organisation of public interest groups working on the climate issue.
The holes in the protocol essentially mean business as usual for the large greenhouse gas emitters, as long as they pay poorer nations to do the dirty job of cutting emissions.
Modest targets
It was glaringly evident in Kyoto that most developed countries were reluctant to make the deep and early cuts of greenhouse gases needed to mitigate global-warming effects. A reduction of 5.2% from 1990 levels, to be achieved between 2008 and 2012, is way below earlier proposals - green groups and developing countries had demanded at least a 7.5% cut by 2005.
Environment group Greenpeace says the Kyoto targets will produce an actual overall reduction of gases by 1% or 2% only. We need a 60% reduction to make a dent on the gaseous 'glass' dome which now envelopes the globe, says the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (the advisory scientific body to the climate treaty).
Why has this figure been completely ignored? Again, it's down to compromise.
Eager to have something at the end of the day, countries relented and reduced targets to break through deadlocks. A case in point is the European Union (EU), which abandoned its ambitious 15% slash proposal for a low of 8%.
'The Union was not willing to sign if the United States (which wanted no cuts at all) did not sign, so the EU bowed down,' explains Gurmit.
To make matters worse, reduction targets can be changed only with the consent of the concerned party. In other words, 'it gives the country a veto mechanism. So you cannot raise the emission target as long as the country disagrees. This makes future target changes difficult,' Gurmit points out.
Loophole 1: Trading hot air
Topping a long list of loopholes in the Kyoto Protocol is 'emissions trading'. This enables a country which has exceeded its emissions quota to 'buy' another country's unused quota.
So why should the United States - the world's biggest emitter of greenhouse gases - bother with replacing fossil fuel with solar energy since it can purchase rights to more emissions from, say, the former Soviet Union?
Since trading is now a done deal in the protocol, Chow says the next best thing is to draw up strict rules and procedures, such as limiting traded amounts. This will be the focus of next year's climate meeting in Buenos Aires, Argentina.
Loophole 2: Emissions banking
Critics also cry foul over 'emissions banking', whereby a country that emits less than it's supposed to can 'carry forward' the surplus to the subsequent period.
For instance, if a country has to reduce emissions by 5% but actually reduces by 8% the extra 3% can be added to next year's target of 5%, thus lowering the reduction rate to 2% in that year.
Green groups say this restricts overall emission-reduction efforts.
Chow, however, views emissions banking optimistically, saying that it can be an incentive to meet targets early as 'any extra emissions can be kept for next year and will not be wasted.'
There was also a proposal to introduce 'emissions borrowing' which would allow a country which exceeds its target to 'borrow' on future emissions rights. This proposal was not accepted - and rightly so as 'borrowing basically defers commitment,' says Chow.
Loophole 3: Carbon for sale
Equally controversial is the concept of joint implementation, where a country which invests in climate-friendly projects, such as reforestation or clean energy facilities, elsewhere can claim credits to offset its own emissions.
Like emissions trading, such joint projects essentially allow the richer country to continue fouling the atmosphere while transferring cutback efforts to the country receiving its 'aid.'
Officially, carbon offset projects are restricted to developed countries. Yet, the protocol actually provides for such schemes among developing countries in the form of the clean development mechanism. This process will finance emission-reduction projects in cash- and technology-starved developing countries.
The saved emissions will then be sold as 'carbon credits' to developed countries in need of these credits to meet their cutback targets. Again, this mechanism allows climate polluters to purchase rights to keep polluting.
For Chow, the clean development mechanism is basically joint implementation in disguise, while Gurmit reckons it permits emissions trading between developed and developing countries.
To prevent exploitation of this scheme, Chow asserts that strict rules and procedures, like those to be drawn up for emissions trading, will be required. He says the amount of carbon credits that can be sold must be restricted and, 'as much as possible, reductions must be made domestically.'
Despite the controversies and claims of 'carbon colonisation', carbon offset projects are being conducted worldwide, including in Malaysia.
For instance, coal plants in the Netherlands and the United States are financing forestry projects in Sabah with hopes of claiming credits to offset their emissions under the protocol.
Loophole 4: Counting carbon sinks
Yet another flaw in the protocol is the inclusion of carbon sinks (natural entities such as forests and soil which can absorb carbon dioxide) in emissions accounting.
So a country can subtract the amount of greenhouse gases supposedly absorbed by sinks from its total emissions. However, the case against this is the fact that there is much scientific uncertainty about exactly how much carbon the sinks can remove from the atmosphere.
Forecast: Cloudy
The future of the Kyoto Protocol is cloudy, to say the least. For the agreement to take effect, at least 55 nations must ratify it - and this must include developed nations with current combined emissions of at least 55% of 1990 levels. However, the math does not work out: there are only 38 countries in Annex I, the list of countries subjected to emission curbs.
'If they cannot get 55 parties, they will insist that developing countries make commitments in order for the protocol to be implemented,' says Gurmit. He also fears that this provision will be exploited to include key developing countries under Annex 1, when the list is reviewed next year.
Both Chow and Gurmit agree, however, that the 55% minimum emission is a good contingency move - just in case some countries decide not to ratify.
'With the earlier proposal of a specific tonnage (before the protocol takes effect), the fear was that as long as the big emitters did not sign, they would hold the protocol to ransom. But now, countries will still make up the 55% even if the largest emitter refuses to participate,' says Chow.
Ultimately, though, you have to ask the question: what use is a treaty if there are no penalties for non-compliance?
This issue was pushed aside at Kyoto, and will only be sorted out sometime in the future.
Given the long list of caveats, it is no wonder that Greenpeace's Bill Hare labels the Kyoto outcome a 'tragedy and a farce'.
Though some quarters are attempting to retain some degree of optimism, stating that the protocol is a legally binding document and a first step, there is no denying one fact: the Kyoto Protocol provides scant protection against increasing environmental and economic damage that the continuous burning of coal and oil will unleash on the world.
It is no wonder, then, that environmentalists and journalists watching the summit closing ceremony on screens put up at the media centre, unanimously scoffed when one delegate stood up and announced jubilantly, 'Today there are no losers and only one winner - the environment.'
Nothing could be further from the truth. (Third World Resurgence No.89, January 1998)
Tan Cheng Li is on the staff of the Malaysian daily, The Star in which the above article first appeared. (23 December, 1997).
by Tan Cheng Li
THE much touted Kyoto Protocol on climate change almost did not materialise. Negotiators worked overnight and extended the meeting by a day to eventually put it together.
But they needn't have bothered. For the document agreed upon in Kyoto, Japan, on 11 December is a flawed one: it has none of the drastic emissions curbs scientists say are essential in averting climate chaos.
Yes, the agreement is historically important as it will, for the first time, legally bind developed countries to rein in emissions of heat-trapping gases. But in practical terms the Kyoto Protocol is an empty vessel which is unlikely to turn down the heat.
At Kyoto, major environmental groups decided that the final agreement will be judged on three points: whether it has the most stringent reduction targets possible; whether it is completely free from loopholes which allow emissions to increase; and whether it has automatic and real penalties for cheating.
The protocol fails on all points. It is a compromise, acknowledges Malaysia's climate treaty negotiator Chow Kok Kee, a Meteorological Services director.
KEY FEATURES
Target Cutbacks
Developed countries must
cut their 1990-level emissions
of six gases by 5.2% between
2008 and 2012.
Japan has the most modest goal,
a cut of 6%, compared with 7%
for the US and 8% for the EU.
Coal-exporting Australia, however,
will increase its emissions by 8%.
Emissions trading
Countries that overshot their
emissions-reduction targets
can "buy" emissions rights
from nations which have excess. Joint Implementation
Emission cuts need not be
confined to within the country.
They can be implemented elsewhere,
with the financing country claiming
credit for the resulting emissions
savings.
Carbon Sinks
To tabulate its total emissions,
a country can subtract the
amount of gases absorbed by
carbon sinks such as forests
within its borders.
Emissions banking
A country that emits less than
its assigned target can keep the
excess for the subsequent period.
'We are not happy with the outcome. The protocol does not address core issues such as setting adequate targets. But in such international negotiations, there is always some compromise.'
Environmentalists are less charitable.
'The protocol is unlikely to make any difference. It gives the false impression that a breakthrough has been achieved but there are too many loopholes,' says Gurmit Singh, regional co-ordinator of Climate Action Network South-East Asia, an organisation of public interest groups working on the climate issue.
The holes in the protocol essentially mean business as usual for the large greenhouse gas emitters, as long as they pay poorer nations to do the dirty job of cutting emissions.
Modest targets
It was glaringly evident in Kyoto that most developed countries were reluctant to make the deep and early cuts of greenhouse gases needed to mitigate global-warming effects. A reduction of 5.2% from 1990 levels, to be achieved between 2008 and 2012, is way below earlier proposals - green groups and developing countries had demanded at least a 7.5% cut by 2005.
Environment group Greenpeace says the Kyoto targets will produce an actual overall reduction of gases by 1% or 2% only. We need a 60% reduction to make a dent on the gaseous 'glass' dome which now envelopes the globe, says the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (the advisory scientific body to the climate treaty).
Why has this figure been completely ignored? Again, it's down to compromise.
Eager to have something at the end of the day, countries relented and reduced targets to break through deadlocks. A case in point is the European Union (EU), which abandoned its ambitious 15% slash proposal for a low of 8%.
'The Union was not willing to sign if the United States (which wanted no cuts at all) did not sign, so the EU bowed down,' explains Gurmit.
To make matters worse, reduction targets can be changed only with the consent of the concerned party. In other words, 'it gives the country a veto mechanism. So you cannot raise the emission target as long as the country disagrees. This makes future target changes difficult,' Gurmit points out.
Loophole 1: Trading hot air
Topping a long list of loopholes in the Kyoto Protocol is 'emissions trading'. This enables a country which has exceeded its emissions quota to 'buy' another country's unused quota.
So why should the United States - the world's biggest emitter of greenhouse gases - bother with replacing fossil fuel with solar energy since it can purchase rights to more emissions from, say, the former Soviet Union?
Since trading is now a done deal in the protocol, Chow says the next best thing is to draw up strict rules and procedures, such as limiting traded amounts. This will be the focus of next year's climate meeting in Buenos Aires, Argentina.
Loophole 2: Emissions banking
Critics also cry foul over 'emissions banking', whereby a country that emits less than it's supposed to can 'carry forward' the surplus to the subsequent period.
For instance, if a country has to reduce emissions by 5% but actually reduces by 8% the extra 3% can be added to next year's target of 5%, thus lowering the reduction rate to 2% in that year.
Green groups say this restricts overall emission-reduction efforts.
Chow, however, views emissions banking optimistically, saying that it can be an incentive to meet targets early as 'any extra emissions can be kept for next year and will not be wasted.'
There was also a proposal to introduce 'emissions borrowing' which would allow a country which exceeds its target to 'borrow' on future emissions rights. This proposal was not accepted - and rightly so as 'borrowing basically defers commitment,' says Chow.
Loophole 3: Carbon for sale
Equally controversial is the concept of joint implementation, where a country which invests in climate-friendly projects, such as reforestation or clean energy facilities, elsewhere can claim credits to offset its own emissions.
Like emissions trading, such joint projects essentially allow the richer country to continue fouling the atmosphere while transferring cutback efforts to the country receiving its 'aid.'
Officially, carbon offset projects are restricted to developed countries. Yet, the protocol actually provides for such schemes among developing countries in the form of the clean development mechanism. This process will finance emission-reduction projects in cash- and technology-starved developing countries.
The saved emissions will then be sold as 'carbon credits' to developed countries in need of these credits to meet their cutback targets. Again, this mechanism allows climate polluters to purchase rights to keep polluting.
For Chow, the clean development mechanism is basically joint implementation in disguise, while Gurmit reckons it permits emissions trading between developed and developing countries.
To prevent exploitation of this scheme, Chow asserts that strict rules and procedures, like those to be drawn up for emissions trading, will be required. He says the amount of carbon credits that can be sold must be restricted and, 'as much as possible, reductions must be made domestically.'
Despite the controversies and claims of 'carbon colonisation', carbon offset projects are being conducted worldwide, including in Malaysia.
For instance, coal plants in the Netherlands and the United States are financing forestry projects in Sabah with hopes of claiming credits to offset their emissions under the protocol.
Loophole 4: Counting carbon sinks
Yet another flaw in the protocol is the inclusion of carbon sinks (natural entities such as forests and soil which can absorb carbon dioxide) in emissions accounting.
So a country can subtract the amount of greenhouse gases supposedly absorbed by sinks from its total emissions. However, the case against this is the fact that there is much scientific uncertainty about exactly how much carbon the sinks can remove from the atmosphere.
Forecast: Cloudy
The future of the Kyoto Protocol is cloudy, to say the least. For the agreement to take effect, at least 55 nations must ratify it - and this must include developed nations with current combined emissions of at least 55% of 1990 levels. However, the math does not work out: there are only 38 countries in Annex I, the list of countries subjected to emission curbs.
'If they cannot get 55 parties, they will insist that developing countries make commitments in order for the protocol to be implemented,' says Gurmit. He also fears that this provision will be exploited to include key developing countries under Annex 1, when the list is reviewed next year.
Both Chow and Gurmit agree, however, that the 55% minimum emission is a good contingency move - just in case some countries decide not to ratify.
'With the earlier proposal of a specific tonnage (before the protocol takes effect), the fear was that as long as the big emitters did not sign, they would hold the protocol to ransom. But now, countries will still make up the 55% even if the largest emitter refuses to participate,' says Chow.
Ultimately, though, you have to ask the question: what use is a treaty if there are no penalties for non-compliance?
This issue was pushed aside at Kyoto, and will only be sorted out sometime in the future.
Given the long list of caveats, it is no wonder that Greenpeace's Bill Hare labels the Kyoto outcome a 'tragedy and a farce'.
Though some quarters are attempting to retain some degree of optimism, stating that the protocol is a legally binding document and a first step, there is no denying one fact: the Kyoto Protocol provides scant protection against increasing environmental and economic damage that the continuous burning of coal and oil will unleash on the world.
It is no wonder, then, that environmentalists and journalists watching the summit closing ceremony on screens put up at the media centre, unanimously scoffed when one delegate stood up and announced jubilantly, 'Today there are no losers and only one winner - the environment.'
Nothing could be further from the truth. (Third World Resurgence No.89, January 1998)
Tan Cheng Li is on the staff of the Malaysian daily, The Star in which the above article first appeared. (23 December, 1997).
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